Three test files (test_auth_regressions, test_auth_event_loop,
test_null_owner_gates) install stubs for core.database / core.auth /
src.endpoint_resolver at module-import time, so they outlive the
file and are still present in sys.modules when later-collected test
files try to import the real modules. The stubs are minimal (a
handful of MagicMock attrs) so the import chain that follows fails
with ImportError on the very next real import.
test_companion_pairing also leaks, with a twist: its _DBStub
subclass returns a MagicMock for *any* attribute including dunders,
so the next test that does `from core.database import *` reads
`__all__` as a MagicMock and dies with 'Item in __all__ must be
str, not MagicMock'.
Move the stub installation into an autouse fixture per file and
register each stub with monkeypatch.setitem so sys.modules is
restored to its pre-test state on teardown. Tighten _DBStub to
refuse dunder names so __all__ stays undefined. _CAPTURED is
cleared per test so the mint-token assertions see a fresh dict.
Before: 3 test files fail at collection time (test_chat_image_routing,
test_context_compactor, test_webhook_ssrf_resilience). After: 0
collection errors. 1365/1370 pass, 1 skip, 4 unrelated pre-existing
failures (verified against origin/main baseline).
Out of scope: test_task_scheduler_session_delivery::
test_session_delivery_survives_empty_database also fails in the
full suite due to order-dependent state from a different test
file. That's a separate leak with a different root cause.
The spinoff endpoint authenticated the caller (_require_user) but never
verified the research session belonged to them before reading the
persisted report and seeding it into a new chat session owned by the
caller. Any authenticated user who knew or guessed another user's
research session ID could exfiltrate that user's full report into their
own session — a cross-user data disclosure (IDOR).
Every other endpoint in this router gates on _owns_in_memory /
_assert_owns_research right after validating the session ID; spinoff was
the lone exception. Add the same _owns_in_memory check (covers both the
in-memory task and the on-disk JSON) so a non-owner gets a 404 before any
data is read or a session is created.
Add regression tests pinning the anonymous (401) and wrong-owner (404)
cases.
