Files
odysseus/src/webhook_manager.py
Tatlatat da3876c168 Webhook: block IPv6 SSRF bypasses
The webhook URL guard's _ip_is_private() only checks a hardcoded
_PRIVATE_NETWORKS list, which misses several addresses that route
internally. validate_webhook_url() therefore ALLOWED:

- http://[::]/                      (IPv6 unspecified, reaches localhost)
- http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/        (IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback = 127.0.0.1)
- http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/  (IPv4-mapped cloud metadata endpoint)

The last one is the dangerous case: a webhook pointed at the mapped
169.254.169.254 can pull cloud instance credentials (SSRF -> credential
theft).

Harden _ip_is_private(): first unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 to its embedded IPv4
(addr.ipv4_mapped), then reject via the stdlib address properties
(is_private, is_loopback, is_link_local, is_reserved, is_multicast,
is_unspecified) in addition to the existing network list. Public addresses
still pass.

tests/test_webhook_ssrf_resilience.py asserts validate_webhook_url raises
for the three IPv6 bypasses plus 127.0.0.1 and 0.0.0.0, and still accepts a
public IP literal. The IPv6 cases fail before this change.
2026-06-02 20:28:12 +09:00

241 lines
8.6 KiB
Python

"""Outgoing webhook manager — fires HTTP POSTs when events happen."""
import asyncio
import hashlib
import hmac
import ipaddress
import json
import logging
import re
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Optional
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import httpx
from src.database import SessionLocal, Webhook
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
ALLOWED_EVENTS = frozenset({
"session.created",
"chat.completed",
"chat.message",
"webhook.test",
})
# Block requests to private/internal networks
_PRIVATE_NETWORKS = [
ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),
ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),
ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"),
]
def _ip_is_private(addr: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> bool:
# If the address is IPv4-mapped IPv6, extract and evaluate the embedded IPv4
if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:
addr = addr.ipv4_mapped
if (
addr.is_private
or addr.is_loopback
or addr.is_link_local
or addr.is_reserved
or addr.is_multicast
or addr.is_unspecified
):
return True
return any(addr in net for net in _PRIVATE_NETWORKS)
def _resolve_hostname_ips(hostname: str) -> list:
"""Resolve a hostname to all its A/AAAA records. Empty list on failure."""
import socket
try:
infos = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
except Exception:
return []
out = []
for info in infos:
sockaddr = info[4]
try:
out.append(ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0]))
except ValueError:
continue
return out
def _is_private_url(url: str) -> bool:
"""Check if a URL points to a private/internal address.
Resolves DNS names so attackers can't hide an internal IP behind
`internal.lan` or `127.0.0.1.nip.io`. Re-checked at delivery time too,
as a partial defense against DNS rebinding.
"""
try:
parsed = urlparse(url)
hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").strip()
if not hostname:
return True
# Block common internal hostnames + suffixes the resolver may not catch.
h_lower = hostname.lower()
if h_lower in ("localhost", "0.0.0.0", "metadata.google.internal", "metadata"):
return True
if h_lower.endswith((".local", ".internal", ".lan", ".intranet", ".localhost")):
return True
# IP literal? short-circuit.
try:
return _ip_is_private(ipaddress.ip_address(hostname))
except ValueError:
pass
# DNS hostname — resolve and check every record.
addrs = _resolve_hostname_ips(hostname)
if not addrs:
# Couldn't resolve → fail closed; let validation reject the URL.
return True
return any(_ip_is_private(a) for a in addrs)
except ValueError:
return True
def validate_webhook_url(url: str) -> str:
"""Validate and normalize a webhook URL. Raises ValueError if invalid."""
url = url.strip()
if len(url) > 2048:
raise ValueError("URL too long (max 2048 characters)")
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise ValueError("URL must use http or https")
if not parsed.hostname:
raise ValueError("URL must have a hostname")
if _is_private_url(url):
raise ValueError("URL must not point to private/internal addresses")
return url
def validate_events(events_str: str) -> str:
"""Validate comma-separated event names. Returns cleaned string."""
events = [e.strip() for e in events_str.split(",") if e.strip()]
if not events:
raise ValueError("At least one event is required")
invalid = set(events) - ALLOWED_EVENTS
if invalid:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid events: {', '.join(sorted(invalid))}. Allowed: {', '.join(sorted(ALLOWED_EVENTS - {'webhook.test'}))}")
return ",".join(events)
def sanitize_error(error: str, max_len: int = 200) -> str:
"""Strip potentially sensitive details from error messages."""
# Remove IP addresses and ports
cleaned = re.sub(r'\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}(:\d+)?', '[redacted]', error)
# Remove hostnames in URLs
cleaned = re.sub(r'https?://[^\s/]+', '[redacted-url]', cleaned)
return cleaned[:max_len]
class WebhookManager:
def __init__(self, api_key_manager=None):
# Disable redirects to prevent SSRF via redirect chains
self._client = httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10, follow_redirects=False)
self._loop: Optional[asyncio.AbstractEventLoop] = None
self._api_key_manager = api_key_manager
def set_loop(self, loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop):
self._loop = loop
def _decrypt_secret(self, encrypted: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Decrypt a webhook signing secret from DB storage."""
if not encrypted:
return None
if self._api_key_manager:
try:
return self._api_key_manager.decrypt_api_key(encrypted)
except Exception:
# If decryption fails, assume it's stored in plaintext (legacy)
return encrypted
return encrypted
def fire_and_forget(self, event: str, payload: dict):
"""Schedule webhook fire from any context (sync or async). Never blocks."""
if event not in ALLOWED_EVENTS:
return
try:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
loop.create_task(self.fire(event, payload))
except RuntimeError:
# Called from a sync thread (e.g. sync FastAPI route in threadpool)
if self._loop and self._loop.is_running():
asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(self.fire(event, payload), self._loop)
async def fire(self, event: str, payload: dict):
"""Fire webhooks matching the given event."""
if event not in ALLOWED_EVENTS:
return
db = SessionLocal()
try:
webhooks = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.is_active == True).all()
matching = [w for w in webhooks if event in w.events.split(",")]
finally:
db.close()
for wh in matching:
decrypted_secret = self._decrypt_secret(wh.secret)
asyncio.create_task(self._deliver(wh.id, wh.url, decrypted_secret, event, payload))
async def deliver_test(self, webhook_id: str, url: str, encrypted_secret: Optional[str]):
"""Public method for the test-webhook route."""
decrypted = self._decrypt_secret(encrypted_secret)
await self._deliver(webhook_id, url, decrypted, "webhook.test", {"message": "Test ping from Odysseus"})
async def _deliver(self, webhook_id: str, url: str, secret: Optional[str], event: str, payload: dict):
"""Internal delivery. Never call directly from outside this class (use deliver_test)."""
# Re-validate URL at delivery time in case DB was tampered with
try:
validate_webhook_url(url)
except ValueError as e:
logger.warning(f"Webhook {webhook_id} has invalid URL, skipping: {e}")
return
body = json.dumps({"event": event, "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(), "data": payload})
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"X-Odysseus-Event": event,
"User-Agent": "Odysseus-Webhook/1.0",
}
if secret:
sig = hmac.new(secret.encode(), body.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
headers["X-Odysseus-Signature"] = sig
db = SessionLocal()
try:
resp = await self._client.post(url, content=body, headers=headers)
db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).update({
"last_triggered_at": datetime.utcnow(),
"last_status_code": resp.status_code,
"last_error": None,
})
db.commit()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Webhook delivery failed for {webhook_id}")
try:
db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).update({
"last_triggered_at": datetime.utcnow(),
"last_status_code": None,
"last_error": sanitize_error(str(e)),
})
db.commit()
except Exception:
db.rollback()
finally:
db.close()
async def close(self):
await self._client.aclose()